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UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION IN THE
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
INTRODUCTIONT HIS COMMENT will discuss the federal income tax issue of unreasonable
compensation as it affects the incorporated professional.' Discussion
will first center on the modus operandi of the professional corporation, and
how the compensation issue arises. Unreasonable compensation will then
be defined and explained in that context. Next, the actual considerations
used in determining whether compensation is excessive or not will be dis-
cussed. Then, the additional requirement that the remuneration be com-
pensation in fact, and not a return on investment, will be investigated.
The applicability of the 50% maximum tax on personal service income
will also be analyzed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn about the
impact of these issues on the future of the incorporated professional.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
Today, more and more people are noticing when it comes time to
make out a check and pay their doctor bills that their physician seems to
have changed his name, since the legend on their bill now reads "make
checks payable to John Jones, M.D., Inc." Moreover, this phenomenon
seems contagious and isn't limited to healers. Attorneys, architects, insurance
agents, accountants and other professionals today are incorporating their
practices. Since only the form of doing business has changed, operations
go on as before, and the professional's daily routine hasn't changed much.
However, his legal status has been altered markedly. Some of the
characteristics of the corporate form of doing business are perpetual ex-
istence, easy transferability of ownership interest, and limited liability. How-
ever, these are of little value to the professional since he is not usually
interested in selling his practice to another, and what happens to it after
he retires is likewise of little concern. Nor is his liability limited, since
public policy dictates personal liability regardless.' The professional's in-
terest is generally in the federal income tax advantage of a corporate pen-
sion plan. Ironically, though, under the corporate form there is the pos-
sibility that the professional may run into other unexpected adverse in-
come tax consequences. These occur if the salary and other benefits the
professional receives are deemed by the Internal Revenue Service to be
excessive or unreasonable in amount. To better understand how a person
can be penalized for making too much we must first examine the details
I See generally Stuetzer, Reasonable Compensation, 25 N.Y.U. TAx INST. 491 (1967); Com-
ment, The Worth of a Man: A Study of Reasonable Compensation in Close Corporations,
38 S. CAL. L. REv. 269 (1965).
2 Ohio so provides by statute. See Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Page 1978).
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of how the incorporated professional has schemed to minimize his tax
liability.
Generally, when a practice is incorporated the professional or pro-
fessionals involved will become the sole stockholders of the corporation.
Sometimes someone else will own a few shares of the corporation's stock,
but the professional will be in control and practically all the profits will
accrue to him. However, this is not the desired result. The federal gov-
ernment imposes a stiff corporate tax on the excess of corporate revenues
over expenses.' When these profits are paid out as dividends they are
taxed again to their recipient under the personal income tax.' Thus, cor-
porate dividends are subject to double taxation. However, the incorporated
professional has a way to avoid, or at least mitigate, this result. All busi-
nesses are allowed to reduce their gross income by their ordinary and
necessary expenses,5 so the professional goes to work for his corporation,
and as an employee draws a salary that is deductible the same as his
secretary's or nurse's. Since today's professionals are generally highly com-
pensated, their salaries tend to write the corporation's profits down to little
or nothing. The problem arises when the corporation makes extremely high
profits and the professional is forced to increase his salary to keep the ex-
cess profits from being subject to the corporate tax. Some unfortunate pro-
fessionals run into this problem year after year. This is where the IRS steps
in. It takes the position that since only ordinary and necessary expenses are
deductible to the corporation, to the extent that the professional's com-
pensation is excessive, it will be disallowed as a deduction,7 subjecting
that amount to the corporate tax as well as the income tax." A corpo-
ration is allowed a deduction for only what a disinterested employer would
have to pay a similarly qualified employee for doing the same type of work;
the rest is deemed unreasonable. Thus the portion of compensation that
exceeds what the professional would be paid in an arm's length situation
will be subject to double taxation.
The courts have long recognized that the element of reasonableness
is inherent in the phrase "ordinary and necessary."9 It is simply not the
intention of Congress to automatically allow as deductions operating ex-
penses incurred or paid by the taxpayer in an unlimited amount.' How-
ever, deductions for compensation usually are not questioned by the IRS
31.R.C. § 11.
4Id. § 61.
5Id. § 162(a).
6 Id.
7Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1960).
aId. § 1.162-8 (1960).
9I.R.C. § 162(a).
1OComn'r v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815, 817 (6th Cir. 1949), cert, dcnfed 338 U.S.
949 (1950).
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except in close corporations. This is because the opportunity to avoid taxes
by arbitrarily overstating salary is so great in entities like the professional
corporation. The controlling stockholder is free to set the amount of his
compensation at will. In fact, so watchful is the IRS of this area that
criminal prosecutions have been brought for willful tax evasion. Such a
conviction can be based merely upon a compensation deduction which is
unreasonable in amount, and is not limited to cases where a deduction
was fraudulently claimed for services that were not rendered at all.'1
The IRS may disallow all or part of a claimed compenation deduction.
This determination carries a presumption of correctness as to amount and
the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his deduction, or any amount
higher than that allowed by the Service, is reasonable."2 Anyone familiar
with the Internal Revenue Code knows this to be the general rule in
tax contests not involving willful fraud. However, the courts are not bound
by the Commissioner's estimate," and are not to be paralyzed by the com-
plex or speculative nature of approximating the proper salary. The fact
that valuation, being essentially a matter of informed judgment and ex-
perience, involves a rough estimate will not stop the courts from appraising
the value of the individual's services.' This sort of "blue penciling" by
the courts is an application of the Cohan rule,'5 which allows estimation
of deductions necessitated by inadequate record keeping.', Although the
issue in most unreasonable compensation cases essentially involves valu-
ation rather than records of the extent of services rendered, the principle
is summed up well in Rugel v. Commissioner:
A taxpayer always has the burden of establishing his right to any
claimed deduction for income tax purposes. Where he seeks to have a
deduction allowed by the Board of Tax Appeals [now the Tax Court],
as an ordinary and necessary business expense.., he must furnish
as definite proof as is reasonably possible, in the situation and circum-
stances, of the nature and details of the expenditures claimed to have
been made. If the evidence is convincing that the expenditures have
thus been made, but the taxpayer is able to furnish only general proof
of the nature and details, the Board should consider all the evidence
in the light of its general experience and make such allowance for
the sums expended as it conscientiously feels would represent fair and
"a United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942).
12 [1980] 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 11,612.
13See, e.g., Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937), afl'd,
95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938).
14 Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 316 U.S. 56 (1942).
15 Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
e Id. at 544. The Cohan rule was made inapplicable to travel, entertainment, amusement,
or recreation expenses by the Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 274(d)). For an example of the present application of Cohan, see Levine
v. Comm'r, 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963).
17 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942).
[Vol. 13:3
3
Falcone: Unreasonable Compensation
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
reasonable expenses for such ordinary and necessary purposes in the
circumstances of the taxpayer's business.18
Keeping in mind that a disappointed taxpayer may with proper proof still
salvage a compromise verdict in these cases, let us now examine the tests
for determining reasonableness.
II. TESTS FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE COMPENSATION
A. Actual Performance of the Services
The first thing the IRS looks for whenever a business takes a deduction
for employee compensation is whether the services were actually rendered.
1
"
Although the amount of work performed is a question of fact, this test
would seem to be less significant in scrutinizing the professional's salary
in a professional, personal service corporation because it is solely from
his labors that the corporation derives its revenues in the first place. All the
revenues are directly traceable to the labor of the professional. He either
produces billable hours or no fees are generated.
B. Reasonableness of Amount
The next item which the IRS questions in unreasonable compensation
cases is the reasonableness of the amount itself." One thing to remember
is that we are talking about the reasonableness of the total compensation
paid to the employee, not just one component. Mayson Manufacturing Co.
v. Commissioner" dismissed the argument that salaries, bonuses, and pen-
sion contributions could be examined and tested separately for reason-
ableness.22 Further, the inquiry is directed to individuals, not the collective
salaries of all the employees. L. Schepp Co. v. Commissioner
23 rejected the
contention that reasonableness could refer to the whole wage policy of the
employer. The fact that a company's total wage policy is reasonable is
no defense to the fact that one or more employees are excessively com-
pensated.2"
The determination of the issue of reasonableness lies solely in the
surrounding circumstances of each case 5 and is therefore strictly a question
of fact for the jury. However, it has been suggested that judges are more
favorable to taxpayers as triers of fact. Jurors apparently tend to take with
a grain of salt being told that someone making more money than all of
Is lId. at 395.
19 11 FED. TAX CooRD. 2d H-2606.1 (May, 1978).
2o Id.
21 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
221d. at 119.
2825 B.T.A. 419 (1932).
24 Id. at 429.
25 First Trust & Say. Bank, Moville, Iowa v. United States, 67-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9233
(N.D. Iowa, Dec. 9, 1966).
COMMENTWinter, 1980]
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them put together is not excessively compensated. 6 Nevertheless, the courts
of appeal may not overturn this fact finding unless it is clearly erroneous." '
Numerous factors have been delineated by courts as relevant to the
issue of reasonableness. None is conclusive, but each is to be examined
separately and its value as evidence considered. 8
One of the most obvious tests would be that of the prevailing rate
of compensation for comparable services in comparable business concerns.2"
If three attorneys incorporated together and the compensation paid one
of them is in issue, the salaries in question are those paid by law firms
of the same general size, not firms with one hundred members. Nor would
one look to the legal department of an insurance company or a rubber
manufacturer. Further, if the attorney was doing work in poverty law, the
salaries paid to patent attorneys would not be relevant to the issue. This
comparison can be made even if other firms' employees are not as qualified
as the taxpayer's. It is especially helpful if a competitor pays less skilled
employees as much as the taxpayer pays his. 0 The desired inference here
is that since competitors pay a like amount for the same work, the tax-
payer is not exceeding what the market dictates. For example, in a case
involving boxer Jack Dempsey, comparison was allowed between the amounts
paid him for the use of his name and services by the taxpayer, and by
his other employers. His compensation from the taxpayer being not dis-
proportionately greater than what others paid, the taxpayer's deduction
was sustained. 1 One court has even allowed evidence of higher salary
offers from competitors to be used to rebut the Commissioner's determination
of unreasonableness. This was allowed even though the taxpayer's officer
was already the most highly compensated executive in the industry."2
Common sense tells us that the individual's qualifications are also
important.3 3 The more education and experience a person has, the more
it would be reasonable to pay him. His rate of compensation can be com-
pared to those drawn by others with equal talents. Furthermore, an ex-
tremely high salary can sometimes be justified on the basis that the person
is a stand-out in his field. This is the part of an individual's qualifications
21 J. FREELAND, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TAPE, Tape 2, Side 4 (1975).
27 Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
23 See First Trust & Say. Bank, Moville, Iowa v. United States, 67-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9233 (N.D. Iowa, Dec. 9, 1966). For an article illustrating the factual inquiries which are
made in such cases, see generally Rogers, "Reasonable Compensation," Deductibility for In-
come Tax Purposes: Three Case Studies, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 118 (1968).
29 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d at 119. But see Perlmutter v. Comm'r, 373 F.2d 45
(10th Cir. 1967), discussed at note 52 infra, which suggests that comparability alone is not
sufficient to establish reasonableness, at least where other negative factors are present.
80Muti-Lead Tool & Eng'r Co., 20 T.C.M. (P-H) 51,050 at 161-62 (Feb. 28, 1951).
81 Jack Dempsey's Punchbowl, Inc. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 1030 (1948).
52 Pfeiffer Brewing Co., 21 T.C.M. (P-H) 52,179 (June 12, 1952).
s Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d at 119.
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that his resume cannot capture. There are many professionals who are
renowned beyond all others in their field. Astronomical amounts can be
considered reasonable if a professional's peers consider him to be one of
the leading experts in his area. This was the case in Eduardo Catalano, Inc., "
which involved a former professor of architecture at one of America's leading
universities. Before Catalano left to form a one-man consulting firm for the
avowed reason of limiting his professional liability, he had become one
of the most distinguished men in his area of architecture. Within a few
years after his corporation began operations he was able to make yearly
contributions to his pension fund of such large amounts that if the con-.
tributions alone had been his only compensation, the reasonableness issue
might have been raised.3" Despite some facts that raised the question of
whether Catalano was just trying to avoid double taxation by increasing
his remuneration, the Tax Court, in light of his extraordinary qualifications,
found his total compensation to be reasonable.36 There is no reason this line
of thinking can't be extended to somewhat lesser mortals. It would seem
that even if our professional isn't the leading person in his field, to the
extent that he has acquired a valuable reputation, it would not be unrea-
sonable for him to demand a premium from his employer.
The courts have also paid deference to individuals with a special
knowledge or experience for their particular duties or their employer's field
of business." One such case involved a diamond appraiser whose skill and
trustworthiness were of paramount importance to his employer. 8 This prin-
ciple would seem applicable to not only the jeweler who incorporates, but
the heart surgeon as well. The courts will also consider experience acquired
in the taxpayer's service. 9 This would seem favorable to the professional,
since he ought to be able to count experience acquired since the day he
went into practice, whether incorporated or not. The point is that the
professional knows how to deal with his employer's particular needs. Round-
ing out the individual's qualifications is the possibility of an innate technical
or inventive ability. If the employee is particularly gifted in his area4 ° or
is adroit at designing, perfecting, or maintaining the company's operations,
"1
the courts will take this as evidence of reasonableness.
There are other factors, such as those dealing with the business of
the employer or the job itself, that bear on the issue of reasonableness and
do not involve the individual. For example, it has previously been seen that
34 [1979] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 79,183 (May 9, 1979).
35 Id. at 726.
Be Id. at 729.
37 Appeal of A.R. Swartz & Co., 5 B.T.A. 264 (1926).
9 Win. Rubin & Son, Inc., 16 T.C.M. (P-H) 47,068 (Mar. 20, 1947).
31 Hawaiian Freight Forwarders, Ltd., 16 T.C.M. (P-H) 47,149 (May 29, 1947).
40 General Brass & Machine Works, Inc., 14 T.C.M. (P-H) 45,308 (Oct. 12, 1945).
41 Soabar Co. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 89 (1946).
COMMENTWinter, 1980]
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the type of work the professional does is one factor to be checked," but
here the actual quality of the work performed by the professional is ex-
amined." Just how well does he actually do the work performed? Also,
remembering that performance in the business world is judged by the fruits
one produces, the results of the professional's labors are paramount." Two
individuals can both be doing an equally expert job in their respective areas,
but if the labors of one produce more profit for the company, there is little
doubt who is more valuable. In Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United
States,5 father and son ceramic contractors were the sole shareholders of
their business. The court found the compensation was reasonable, since the
two employees played a critical role in the corporation's unusually suc-
cessful and profitable operations." In addition, if the employee's duties are
of a type not normally required of such employment, or the company's
services are unusual in the sense of being new or not generally performed in
the industry, the courts can take such evidence as justifying higher com-
pensation."
A personal service corporation isn't necessarily limited to just a few
employees. How well those in charge wield the employees beneath them
can be just as important as how they handle and satisfy the customers. Just
because capital isn't a material income-producing factor in professional cor-
porations, that doesn't mean that there can't be a number of employees
under the control of the professional. This would be so, for instance, in an
engineering firm and comes under the recognized category of technical
managerial ability."8 A related heading the courts have approved is that
of general managerial ability. Here an employee receives credit for his
abilities in formulating and administering the successful operation and
policies of the business.'" The size of the enterprise is important, since
the greater the size and complexity of the business, the more evidence there
is of reasonableness.5" For example, few would question that the work of
a surgeon is more complex than that of a plumber.
Also, the bigger the operations and volume of business are, the higher
compensation can be without becoming a larger percentage of total reve-
nues.51 As the business becomes more profitable, the person responsible de-
serves greater compensation. In short, the better the general economic con-
42 See text following note 29 supra.
43 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r 178 F.2d at 119.
44d.
45422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
SId. at 1340.
47 Insul-Mastic Corp. of America, 19 T.C.M. (P-H) 50,167 (June 30, 1950).
48 Eitel-McCullough, Inc. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 1132 (1947).
4 'H.V. Greene Co. v. Comm'r, 5 B.T.A. 442 (1926).50 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d at 119.
51 Id.
[V/ol. 13:3
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ditions of the business are, the better the position of the taxpayer is. This
kind of rationale is used in justifying contingent compensation agreements,
reasonable when entered into, which become unreasonable bonanzas for
the employee when business later booms. Perlmutter v. Commissioner2
seems to take the position that if compensation is increased disproportionately
to what the Service feels is an unreasonable amount, the fact that other
businesses in the same line pay like salaries cannot be relied upon. Rather,
additional concrete evidence should be introduced to justify the increase. 3
For example, a significant expansion of operations or increase in profits
would seem to be the palpable kind of evidence necessary for the taxpayer
to carry his burden of proof.5'
In addition, if the responsibility for such increments, or even the gen-
eral success or profits themselves, are attributable to the employer's officer,
then there is strong evidence of reasonableness. If it can be shown that the
employee is responsible for building up the business and is chiefly respon-
sible for its growth, the Commissioner's position is weakened. 5 This would
seem to be especially applicable to the professional corporation since its
success and viability depends almost wholely on the dominant professional.
Increased business activities can also lead to greater employee duties.
Pacific Grains, Inc."5 is based on the premise that increasing responsibility
or workload is an indication of reasonableness. In that case the court held
that where large, unexplained increases and bonuses had occurred near the
end of the tax year, there could be no deduction since there was no evidence
of an increase in the taxpayer's duties."' Also, additional services, in the
sense of duties beyond those normally expected in the firm or industry,
can stand to rebut the charge of unreasonableness.
5 8
This brings us to an examination of the actual process by which the
employee's compensation comes to be determined, and how this internal
corporate process bears on the reasonableness of the benefits. In any un-
52 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).
5 Compare Perlmutter with Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949) and
Jack Dempsey's Punchbowl, Inc. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 1030 (1948), discussed at note 31
supra, which held that compensation which was comparable to that paid by other businesses
in the field was reasonable. The apparent contradiction is explained by the presence of
other factors in Perlmutter, i.e., the officer's salary was greatly increased at a time when no
dividends were paid, and the corporation's gross and net income and the officer's own activities
had all decreased. The Perlmutter court weighed these factors against the comparability of
salaries, 373 F.2d at 48, and concluded that the shareholder-officer was not entitled to a
deduction.
54 See 373 F.2d at 48.
55 Good Chevrolet, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,291 (Aug. 30, 1977).
56 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 67,007 (Jan. 13, 1967), af'd on other grounds, 399 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.
1968).
57 36 T.C.M. (P-H) at 55. See also text following note 81 infra.
58 Merchandise Terminal Warehouse, Inc., 11 T.C.M. (P-H) 42,514 (Sept. 21, 1942). See
text accompanying note 47 supra.
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reasonable compensation proceeding, the corporation will strengthen its
case by showing that the actions of its board of directors were taken without
any undue influence from the employee. However, in the setting of the pro-
fessional corporation, for all practical purposes the professional is the
board of directors. Generally, his decision making power is unrestrained.
This is evident in Perlmutter, where the court held that total control of
the company by the employee and his informal practice of making salary
withdrawals were factors to be used in discounting the claim of reason-
ableness. 9 Although a professional's practice of constantly changing his
own salary and awarding himself bonuses bears on the question of com-
pensation in fact,"0 it also reflects on reasonableness. This is because it
tends to indicate a lack of real bargaining in the wage determining process.
In essence, the professional merely takes whatever he wants, subject only
to availability. Since there is no independent party guarding the till, it be-
comes his personal expense account which he may raid at will.
However, these compensation increments can easily be justified by a
change in economic conditions. If a corporate officer was either under-
compensated or received no salary during the formative years of the busi-
ness, or during financial hard times, this can be a justification for changing
salaries.0' This is because the services compensated for needn't be performed
in the taxable year. If they were actually rendered in prior years but were never
compensated, the unreasonableness charge can be discounted by showing
that part of the present salary is for those past services.' This common
practice of the officers or owners of close corporations taking pay cuts in
times of financial stress 3 seems analogous to the professional situation of
the lean, clientele-building years. Also, a tradition of modest raises or
bonuses in the past can be used to refute the claim that raises or year end
payments are motivated by tax avoidance. "
Finally, there are a few miscellaneous salary comparisons that can be
made to shed light on the reasonableness issue. One is the ratio of the
professional's total compensation to the corporation's net and gross in-
comes.0 5 Although this may bear also on the compensation in fact issue,
it relates to the reasonableness issue in that, generally speaking, busi-
nesses don't pay out all or almost all of their revenues to a single individual,
nor do they pay out all or almost all of their profits to even the most valu-
able employee." Outside of the professional corporation, one of the areas
59 373 F.2d at 48.
e
0 See text following note 71 infra.
61 Marshall & Spencer Co. v. Comm'r, 7 B.T.A. 454 (1927).
62 1d.
63 See Universal Steel Co. v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 627 (1945).
54 Appeal of Max Levy & Co., 3 B.T.A. 422 (1926).
65 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d at 119.
68 See, e.g., Atlas Plaster and Fuel Co. v. Comm'r, 55 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1932).
[Vol. 13:3
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of concern is the relationship between stockholdings and compensation, but
in a professional corporation this is the basic problem. There will naturally
be a relationship, since the professional or professionals will own the cor-
poration almost entirely. In a one-man firm the relationship will be absolute,
but with two or more people there will be room to make valuable com-
parisons. If the two professionals have equal stockholdings but different
compensation, and the compensation of the one paid the most is questioned,
the corporation can defend by showing that it pays the more qualified person
a higher salary and thereby rebut the inference that the two simply take their
compensation in partnership-like agreement. Why would one stockholder let
another take a larger share of the profits if he weren't worth it? Nevertheless, it
is still wise to try to show that the higher paid individual does more work or
actually is more experienced. 7 This is especially important where there are
unequal stockholdings and the greater shareholder also receives more pay."8
However, the fact that professionals in such corporations are share-
holders makes less useful another analysis that courts have recommended.
This is the comparison of the professional's salary to those of other em-
ployees.69 In another setting this would tend to reveal any deviation from
the corporation's general salary policy, but in the professional corporation
all the professionals could conspire to pay each other a portion of their
respective share of the profits in the form of salaries. Another difficulty
is the fact that there will probably be only a few people in such corporations
available for comparison. This is because of the generally small size of
professional corporations, and the non-professional status of other em-
ployees. In other words, there is only a small number of peers to com-
pare the professional to, and most of the other employees make poor
comparisons.
C. Compensation in Fact
Even if all these factors are examined and weighed, and the determina-
tion is that the amount is reasonable, there is still one more requirement which
the IRS can employ to win. This additional requirement, beyond actual
performance of the services" and reasonableness in amount,"1 is that of
compensation in fact. In other words, salary received must be both "rea-
sonable in amount and compensatory in character." 2 What this means is
that if part of the salary paid is actually a dividend, the deduction is dis-
allowed for that amount and it is subject to double taxation." What we
67 Appeal of Woodcliff Silk Mills, 1 B.T.A. 715, 718 (1925).
6 8 See, e.g., Twin City Tile and Marble Co. v. Comm'r, 32 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1929).
69 Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d at 119.
7 0 See text following note 19 supra.
71 See text following note 20 supra.
72 Eduardo Catalano, Inc., [1979] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) at 728.
T8 This is because corporations may deduct expenses, I.R.C. § 162(a), but not dividends
for shareholders, see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1960). At the same time, dividends
are taxable to the recipient, I.R.C. § 61.
Winter, 1980] COMMENT
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are concerned with here is the fact that if all the capital in the professional
corporation had been put up by a separate entrepreneur he would probably
expect some return on his investment and any working capital retained.
Corporations pay dividends, and if a professional corporation doesn't, it
will raise not only the compensation in fact issue, but reasonableness as well.
Earlier, mention was made of the McCandless74  case, where the
compensation had been held to be reasonable in amount. Not mentioned
was the fact that the IRS won that case. In McCandless, where no dividends
had ever been paid, the court computed a return on capital based on 15%
of net profits before salaries, and deemed that portion of the salaries a
non-deductible dividend. 5 Although this approach seems contrary to statu-
tory language,"0 it is sanctioned by the regulations" and followed by both
the IRS and the courts. As the court put it:
We think it clear that any return on equity capital is so conspicuous
by its absence as to indicate, given all the facts, that the purported
compensation payments necessarily contained a distribution of corpo-
rate earnings . . . . [A] corporation's highly efficient operation and
its clearly demonstrated profit-making ability . . . . justifies a sub-
stantial investment return.
This is not to say that the absence of dividends is conclusive. The court in
Nor-Cal A diusters78 specifically stated that it is not, but went on to say that
a profitable corporation with the ability to pay has the great burden of
explaining its poor or non-existent dividend record.80
Sometimes the method by which the salaries are determined will shed
light on the dividend issue. The aforementioned practice of increasing com-
pensation with unexplained bonuses and raises 1 tends to hint at the ex-
istence of disguised dividends. National Underwriters, Inc.12 is illustrative.
In that case, insurance agents estimated profits each month and paid them
out in the form of bonuses, successfully writing corporate profits down to
zero. The Tax Court had little difficulty in such an extreme case.83 Never-
theless, changing salaries and granting bonuses at special board meetings
is evidence against the corporation.
The type of compensation arrangement can also be revealing. For
74 422 F.2d at 1336. See text following note 45 supra.
75 Id. at 1340.
76 I.R.C. § 162(a) permits "a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered[.]"
77See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1) (1960).
78 422 F.2d at 1339-40.
7040 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,200 (Aug. 16, 1971).
so ld. at 882.
81 See text at note 57 supra.
82 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,014 (Jan. 23, 1974).
88 Id. at 57.
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example, in Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Commissioner" a group of
doctors formed a medical corporation and contracted themselves out to it
on the basis of a fee schedule. This type of arrangement was less blatant
than a percentage-of-profits contract, which would have been set so close
to 100% of the profits in order to achieve the desired result that it would
clearly have shown the parties' intentions of disguising dividends. Accord-
ingly, the doctors based their pay scale on a fee schedule fairly represen-
tative of that charged by other physicians. This arrangement would have
been successful if the company had not continued to show profits above
the amounts paid the doctors under their contract. These profits were paid
out in bonuses and were disallowed by the Tax Court, which reasoned that
the doctors already had an arrangement that would compensate them ac-
cording to their performances; there was no business reason to reward them
with further bonuses.8"
Courts speak of payment in good faith 6 in these agreements, and
being generally accustomed to dealing with sales commission contracts call-
ing for under 5% of gross sales, they are not likely to validate contracts
aimed at wiping out corporate profits."
The exact treatment of disallowed amounts remains to be considered.
We have already said that disallowance of a deduction means that such
amounts will be subject to the corporate income tax, assuming that previous-
ly the corporation was at least breaking even. We then said that double
taxation occurred, as the recipient was taxed regardless of disallowance, as-
suming no agreement to repay in such an event.8 8 Because of the profession-
al's stockholder relationship to the corporation, any disallowed amount will
be treated as dividends. This is the concept of constructive dividends; no
formal corporate declaration is necessary.8" However, disallowed dividends
are not only ordinary income, i.e., non-capital gains, they are also passive
income, and therefore not eligible for the 50% maximum tax rate on
earned income." This is because the Code states that earned income "does
not include that part of the compensation derived by the taxpayer for per-
sonal services rendered by him to a corporation which represents a dis-
tribution of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance for
8429 T.C. 339 (1957).
a5 Id. at 343.
86 [1980] 2 FED. TAXES (P-H) 11,692(5).
87 R.H. Oswald Co. v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1950).88 See note 73 supra. An agreement to repay would give the professional a deduction, while
the rebate would not be income to the corporation. Blanton v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966).
89 Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. United States, 4 A.F.T.R.2d 59-5009 (W.D. Wis. May 14,
1959).
In a family corporation, such amounts might be treated as non-taxable gifts. See
Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 294 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Smith v. Manning, 189 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1951). If considered as part payment for
property, compensation can be treated as capital gains. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1960).
90 See I.R.C. § 1348.
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compensation for the personal services actually rendered." 1 Since the type
of individual whose compensation might be questioned as unreasonable
could well have total income exceeding the 50% bracket, the constructive
dividend could easily be taxed at greater than the 50% limit applicable to
the rest of the professional's salary and bonuses.
CONCLUSION
The success of professional corporations rests on the performance and
foresight of those in charge. Their profitability stems largely from labor
and not capital and it is only fair that the rewards of a labor-intensive
operation should go to the laborer responsible. Nevertheless, a corporation
can't, year after year, pay out all, or almost all, of its profits as compensa-
tion to the shareholder-employee. Even though the profits stem from the
employee's personal efforts, they belong to the corporation and not the
professional. This is the price of using the corporate form. However, the
liberal attitude taken by the courts and the recent reduction of the corpor-
ate tax rate to 17% for the first $25,000 of profits 2 would seem to mitigate
the problem sufficiently that the benefits still outweigh the costs.
VINCENT J. FALCONE
91 Id. § 911(b).
92I.R.C. § 11(b)(1).
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